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Abstract 
In some Western societies, inquiries into fatal abuse of children known to agencies are nowadays a 
common phenomenon. They have been carried out in the UK for many years, but have recently also 
emerged in the Netherlands. The main aim of these inquiries is to improve child welfare and protection 
practice in order to reduce the chance of further child deaths. However, there is reason to critically 
consider the feasibility of this aim, as British research into child death investigations suggests that they 
have hardly worked and even may have had counter productive consequences. This paper examines for 
the first time all Dutch public inquiry reports into child abuse fatalities. It is shown that the problems 
highlighted in the reports are highly similar to those recurring in their British counterparts. 
Furthermore, there are considerable similarities between Dutch and British investigations regarding the 
solutions they propose. Like British inquiries and reviews, Dutch inquiries largely focus on changing 
procedures, introducing decision-making instruments and increasing monitoring. This one-sided 
emphasis on bureaucratic measures, the paper argues, does not rate the human side of child protection 
work at its true value, and makes it questionable whether the inquiries will contribute to improving 
practice. 
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Introduction 
In contemporary Western societies, serious and fatal abuse of children tends to cause 
public outcry, particularly if these children were known to child welfare and 
protection services. Oftentimes, responsibility for such cases is attributed not only to 
the actual abusers, but also to agencies and professionals that allegedly failed to 
prevent a bad outcome. In some countries, this involves holding official inquiries into 
professional practice after child abuse tragedies (Parton, 1998, 2006; Axford and 
Bullock, 2005; Lachman and Bernard, 2006). Such inquiries are most common in the 
UK, where, from the 1970s onwards, they have significantly shaped childcare policy 
and practice as well as the image of social work with children and families in the 
public‘s mind (see, e.g. Munro, 2004c; Parton, 2006).  
Recently, inquiries into serious or fatal child abuse have also emerged in the 
Netherlands. In the last decade, there have been a number of fatal child abuse cases 
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that shocked the public and provoked investigations into possible professional failure, 
resulting in public reports. The first notorious case occurred in 2002, when, in 
Roermond, six children died in a fire started by their father. The family was known to 
twelve professionals and agencies. In 2004, three-year-old Savanna died after a long 
period of serious abuse mainly by her mother, despite being under supervision of 
child protection services. Two years after Savanna‘s death, new outrage was caused 
by the discovery of the body parts of a girl in the Meuse near Rotterdam. Eventually, 
the so-called ‗Meuse-girl‘ (Maasmeisje) turned out to be the teenager Gessica, who 
had been known to child-care organisations and health care services. The most recent 
case attracting attention is that of ‗baby T.‘, who died in 2007 after abuse by her 
parents. A year before, another baby of the same parents had been removed after his 
birth.  
Of these tragedies, the death of Savanna has had most impact on Dutch society. 
This case has become symbolic of failing childcare and protection and is, as such, 
comparable to ‗Victoria Climbié‘ and ‗Baby Peter‘ in Britain. ‗Savanna‘ is used to 
justify several changes in child-care policy and practice, and is thought to have 
contributed to earlier intervention by child protection workers in families. In this 
respect, it is spoken about as the ‗Savanna effect‘ (see, e.g. Bruning, 2007). What 
makes this case particularly unique is that it led to the prosecution of the front line 
worker charged with supervising Savanna. Though she was eventually acquitted, this 
first indictment of a child protection worker in Dutch history aroused strong protest 
among practitioners all over the country, saying that the risk of being prosecuted as a 
practitioner will negatively influence their work. 
In the Savanna case, as well as in the other ones, inquiries appear to have played an 
important part in attracting public and political attention to problems in child welfare 
and protection work. The formal purpose of these inquiries is to improve professional 
practice, with the ultimate aim of reducing the chance of further child abuse fatalities.  
However, good reasons exist to scrutinise whether the inquiries are to be expected 
to contribute to this goal. In Britain, there is a considerable body of research on child 
abuse inquiries, stating that they have failed in improving practice and even may have 
had counter productive consequences, partly due to a wrong focus (see, e.g. Hill, 
1990; Reder and Duncan, 2004a; Munro, 2005a, 2005b). This raises the question as to 
whether Dutch inquiries differ so much from their British counterparts that they are 
more likely to make a positive contribution. 
In this paper, for the first time, we critically examine all seven published Dutch 
inquiries into the role of agencies and practitioners in fatal child abuse cases (Arnhem 
(2000), Roermond (2002), Savanna (2004), Tolbert (2005), Case D. (2005), Gessica 
(2006) and Baby T. (2007)). Where relevant, we compare our findings with what is 
known about child abuse investigations in Britain.  
The paper is organised as follows. After briefly describing the role of some key 
actors in Dutch child protection work, we go into the characteristics of inquiring in the 
Netherlands. In the next section, we outline the main themes featuring in the inquiry 
reports, which have, as we subsequently show, significant resemblance to problems 
highlighted in British investigations. Thereafter, the reports‘ recommendations are 
discussed, which, similar to British investigation reports, mainly focus on bureaucratic 
solutions. The following section provides an analysis of a topic in which Dutch and 
British inquiries importantly differ: the allocation of blame for child deaths to 
professionals and agencies. This analysis considers also the wider societal context of 
the inquiries. Parts of this section, as well as other passages throughout the paper, are 
based on an investigation of the press coverage of fatal child abuse cases in the 
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Netherlands since 2000, particularly focusing on the cases considered in this paper. 
Using the database LexisNexis, we examined the coverage in all national newspapers, 
some regional newspapers, as well as a few news magazines. That is not to deny that 
electronic media are important, or, in a way, may be even more important than 
newspapers (cf. Parton, 2006), but simply because ‗television and radio are fugitive‘ 
(Aldridge, 1999, p. 90) and therefore harder to investigate. Finally, we discuss the 
likelihood that the inquiries will contribute to improvements in Dutch child welfare 
and protection practice. It is argued that since there is, just as in the UK, a discrepancy 
between the bureaucratic solutions the inquiry reports propose and the nature of the 
identified problems, the inquiries‘ contribution is questionable. To make progress, an 
approach is needed that devotes more attention to the human side of child welfare and 
protection work. 
 
Youth Care Agencies and supervision of services  
One of the key actors in Dutch child welfare and protection work is the Youth Care 
Agency (Bureau Jeugdzorg), which is located in every province and in three 
metropolitan areas. (In the Netherlands, the equivalent of the term ‗youth‘, viz. 
‗jeugd‘, is used to indicate children and young people from birth to adulthood.) 
TheYouth Care Agency assesses requests for assistance and, if needed, refers children 
and parents to specialised (voluntary) care. It is also responsible for carrying out child 
protection orders issued by the juvenile court, such as supervision orders, which may 
or may not be supplemented by out-of-home placements (cf. Netherlands Institute for 
Care and Welfare, 2004; Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport, 2005). To carry out 
supervision orders, Youth Care Agencies employ family supervisors, who are a kind 
of social worker with at least a bachelor‘s degree. They are charged with monitoring 
the child‘s development and supporting the child and its parents to solve their 
problems (cf. Van Nijnatten, 2006, 2008). Youth Care Agencies also host an Advice 
and Reporting Centre for Child Abuse and Neglect (Advies- en Meldpunt 
Kindermishandeling), to which suspected child abuse should be reported.  
Obviously, besides Youth Care Agencies, many organisations and practitioners 
play a role in Dutch child welfare and protection work. All of them are supervised by 
various inspectorates, like the Youth Care Inspectorate (Inspectie jeugdzorg (IJZ)), 
the Health Care Inspectorate (Inspectie voor de Gezondheidszorg (IGZ)) and the 
Inspectorate of Education (Inspectie van het Onderwijs (IO)). Of these, the Youth 
Care Inspectorate has a central position in conducting child death inquiries. 
Sometimes in collaboration with other inspectorates but mostly alone, it has 
investigated all cases concerned in this paper. For this reason, we pay most attention 
to this inspectorate and its working methods.  
 
Inquiring into child abuse fatalities in the Netherlands 
Compared to Britain, where child abuse inquiries date back to at least 1945 and have 
increased considerably since 1973 (Corby et al., 1998, 2001), the Netherlands have a 
relatively short history of inquiring into practice after child abuse cases. The first 
inquiry into child protection practice did not concern negligence, but acting 
overzealously. In 1988, the so-called Bolderkar affair took place, which, similar to the 
1987 Cleveland case in Britain, concerned the removal of several children from their 
homes after suspicions of sexual abuse. While the independent inquiry committee into 
this case reported professional failure (Baartman et al., 1989), its criticism was rather 
moderate compared to the way child-care professionals were criticised in the public 
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and media discourse, depicting parents and children as victims of a witch hunt 
(Edwards and Soetenhorst-de Savornin Lohman, 1994; Roelofs and Baartman, 1997).  
By emphasising the danger of false positives, the Bolderkar affair, along with 
similar cases, may have contributed to the false negatives at issue in child abuse 
fatalities coming to the fore only recently (cf. Roelofs and Baartman, 1997). It lasted 
until the late 1990s before inquiries into child death cases were initiated, as can be 
deduced from successive annual reports of the Youth Care Inspectorate‘s 
predecessors, the Youth Welfare Inspectorate (Inspectie Jeugdhulpverlening (IJHV)) 
and the Youth Welfare and Youth Protection Inspectorate (Inspectie 
Jeugdhulpverlening en Jeugdbescherming (IJHVJB)) (IJHV, 1989–94; IJHVJB, 
1995–99, 2000a, 2001). In 2000, for the first time, an inquiry report was made public 
and from 2002 onwards, reports have been published on the internet.  
Since inquiry reports have been published in only seven fatal child abuse cases, the 
question arises as to what determines whether an inquiry is commissioned and, if so, 
whether a report is published. Obviously, a necessary condition for conducting an 
inquiry is the involvement of agencies with the child concerned. Until 2005, the 
Youth Care Inspectorate had to rely largely on media reports for receiving notice of 
serious or fatal abuse of children known to agencies but, since then, agencies are 
bound to report such cases to the Inspectorate and to the provincial government 
responsible for childcare (IJZ, 2006b). When taking notice of a serious case, the 
Inspectorate normally requests the organisation(s) involved to conduct an internal 
evaluation addressing the Inspectorate‘s questions and demands. If the evaluation is 
deemed insufficient, the Youth Care Inspectorate may decide to conduct its own 
inquiry. Also, national and provincial (and in some cases local) governments may 
commission an inquiry (cf. IJZ, 2007a, 2008a). Indeed, most of the inquiries 
considered here were undertaken at the request of national, provincial or local 
governments. This applies not only to high-profile cases like ‗Savanna‘ and ‗Gessica‘, 
but also to a case such as ‗Arnhem‘, which has been much less publicised and turned 
out to have relatively little impact in the long term.  
However, it should be emphasised that the child death inquiries we investigate in 
this paper are not the only inquiries that have been carried out, but the ones that 
resulted in public reports. As can be concluded from media reports as well as annual 
reports of the Youth Care Inspectorate (e.g. IJZ, 2007a), there have also been inquiries 
that yielded no public report. The decision whether or not to publish a report seems to 
be taken on a more or less ad hoc basis; clear criteria governing this decision are not 
known. Yet, a comparison of the inquiries that did and did not result in public reports 
reveals some interrelated factors that appear to contribute to the likelihood of 
publication of a report. It should, however, be kept in mind that we know little about 
unpublished inquiries, so firm conclusions cannot be drawn here.  
A first factor that apparently increases the likelihood of a public report is the extent 
of media coverage. Most of the cases leading to public inquiry reports attracted 
considerable media attention before publication of the reports, while there were no 
well publicised cases that yielded no public report. A second factor that seems to be of 
importance is whether inquiries are conducted at the request of governments. This 
counts for nearly all published inquiries, while we know of only one inquiry 
commissioned by a government that did not result in a public report. A third factor is 
whether inquiries identify certain problems or failures either on behalf of the 
organisations involved or the responsible governments, and subsequently issue 
recommendations that are thought to deserve a wider public audience.  
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Although the inquiries carried out by Dutch inspectorates seem to have a similar 
function as British public inquiries, there are significant differences in form. Whereas 
many British inquiries have adopted a quasi-judicial approach, characterised by 
lawyers as chairs, legal representation for witnesses and cross-examinations (Corby et 
al., 1998, 2001), Dutch inquiries are conducted in an inquisitorial way, using mainly 
written documents, often complemented by interviews with practitioners and 
managers. Unlike British inquiries, which are sometimes held in public and often 
name professionals (Corby et al., 1998; Burgess, 2008), Dutch inquiries have no 
public proceedings and keep professionals anonymous. In that respect, Dutch 
inspectorate inquiries resemble Serious Case Reviews (SCRs) more than public 
inquiries. Furthermore, Dutch inquiries are of shorter duration and the reports have a 
more limited size than public inquiries such as that into the death of Victoria Climbié 
(Lord Laming, 2003). Whereas the Laming report has about 400 pages, none of the 
Dutch reports runs to 100 pages. This applies even when one adds up the number of 
pages of the several reports that, in some single cases, have been published due to the 
engagement of various inspectorates. The fact that inquiries in the Netherlands are 
carried out by inspectorates, which may be characterised as vested institutions, 
signifies yet another difference with British inquiries, which are often undertaken by 
ad hoc committees or panels (cf. Corby et al., 2001; Burgess, 2008). 
 
Main themes in the inquiry reports 
The Dutch inquiry reports identify several factors that seem problematic in child 
welfare and protection work. Below, we outline the main failures and concerns 
pointed to in the reports. 
 
Co-ordination, collaboration and responsibilities 
Most inquiry reports criticise the co-ordination and balancing of services and duties. 
Problems arise when many professionals are involved with the child and the family, 
especially when they work for agencies from various sectors, like childcare, health 
care, education and police. The reports criticise practitioners and agencies for having 
been insufficiently aware of each other‘s activities and duties, and having failed to 
harmonise responsibilities (e.g. IJHVJB, 2002a; IGZ, 2005; IJZ, 2008b). In this 
respect, they point to lacking or unclear procedures that are believed to have 
discouraged practitioners from communicating, acting and taking responsibility. In the 
Gessica case, for instance, according to the joint inspectorates, none of the involved 
care providers acted like a ‗problem owner‘ (IGZ et al., 2007, p. 13). The Youth Care 
Inspectorate states that lacking clarity as to who is responsible for establishing and 
maintaining collaboration between professionals involved puts children growing up in 
disadvantaged circumstances at ‗great risk‘ (IJZ, 2007c, p. 19). Worth mentioning in 
this respect is the specific role the inspectorates assign to the family supervisor 
involved in the Savanna case. They believe that the family supervisor appointed for 
the girl was ‗primarily responsible‘ for co-ordinating and directing services (IGZ, 
2005, p. 5), following their notion of a family supervisor beingmore of a ‗director‘ of 
services than a practitioner providing care (IJZ, 2005b, p. 4). The inspectorates 
believe that in the Savanna case, this function has not been carried out properly. At 
the same time, the involvement of the family supervisor is said to have inhibited other 
practitioners in their actions, as they considered the supervisor‘s presence a 




Poor information exchange between practitioners, negatively influencing the 
assessment of situations and decision making, is a recurring theme in most of the 
inquiry reports (e.g. IJHVJB, 2002a; IJZ, 2005b; IGZ, 2007; IGZ et al., 2007). 
According to the reports, practitioners failed to integrate single observations and did 
not recognise a pattern in signs because of poor information sharing. In the Savanna 
case, for instance, the Youth Care Inspectorate (IJZ, 2005b, p. 3) states this has had 
‗huge consequences‘ for the assessment of the girl‘s safety. In another case, the Youth 
Care Inspectorate criticises a Youth Care Agency‘s separated data systems, which are 
said to contribute to poor information exchange within the organisation (IJZ, 2005c). 
Some reports notice a reluctance amongst practitioners to share information because 
of perceived restrictions resulting from professional confidentiality. In the cases 
concerned, the inspectorates decline this attitude and criticise professionals for not 
sufficiently having used available possibilities to share information in the child‘s 
interest.  
 
Record-keeping, transparency and accountability 
Several reports reveal poor documentation of observations and signs of abuse and 
neglect, and criticise practitioners‘ recording of analyses, decisions and activities (e.g. 
IJZ, 2005b; IGZ, 2007). In the Savanna case, for instance, this is illustrated by the 
Youth Care Inspectorate‘s observation that practitioners‘ considerations and 
expectations about activities and services needed were insufficiently and not 
systematically documented. Also, the assistance plans underlying care provision are 
criticised for lacking explicit goals and not being evaluated properly. According to the 
Inspectorate, care records should contain the rationale of practitioners‘ activities, 
decisions made and its underlying grounds, as well as practitioners‘ responsibilities 
resulting from agreements (IJZ, 2005b). At this point, it deserves attention that 
particularly the Youth Care Inspectorate‘s Savanna report tends to make no clear 
distinction between considerations and actions that have not been recorded on the one 
hand and considerations and actions that have not taken place on the other. So, in a 
way, it seems to reduce actual practice to what can be seen of it retrospectively. 
 
Noticing child abuse 
Apart from the criticism on documenting signs of abuse and neglect, all cases reveal 
the complexity of noticing and interpreting signs that point towards abuse or neglect. 
In several cases, practitioners who considered applying for a child protection order 
repeatedly believed their concerns were not serious or obvious enough to ask the 
Child Protection Board (Raad voor de Kinderbescherming) to start off the required 
inquiry into the child and family (e.g. IJZ 2005b, 2008b). In the Savanna case, the 
inquiry reports show practitioners disagreed on the assessment of risk factors, the 
situation at home and the assistance needed. According to the Health Care 
Inspectorate (IGZ, 2005, p. 4), signs have not been rated ‗at their true value‘ and 
events have not been compiled. However, problems on this matter do not only involve 
difficulties of interpretation and failures to see alarming events in the context of the 
case history. Some of the reports also point to an absence of signs indicating serious 
abuse (e.g. IJZ, 2006a, 2007b). 
 
Dealing with parents and focus on the child 
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Several inquiry reports highlight practitioners‘ difficulties in dealing with parents. A 
concern often shown in the reports is that practitioners have not paid enough attention 
to family and parental problems and its consequences for the children (e.g. IJHVJB, 
2002a; IGZ, 2005, 2007; IJZ, 2008b). In this respect, a lack of risk assessments about 
the safety of children is criticised. Another, and, in most cases, related, problem is that 
practitioners and parents differ in their opinion about the assistance needed (e.g. 
IJHVJB, 2000b, 2002a; IJZ, 2005b). In the Savanna case, the Youth Care Agency is 
reproached for simply having accepted the mother‘s initiative to end certain 
compulsory services and having complied with her request to reduce contact (IJZ, 
2005b). Furthermore, practitioners are judged to have been ‗insufficiently alert and 
sensitive‘ to manipulation by the mother (IGZ, 2005, p. 4); the family supervisor is 
criticised for having been guided too much by the mother‘s perspective (IJZ, 2005b). 
Although the Youth Care Inspectorate recognises the significance of building a good 
working relationship with parents, it believes the focus on Savanna‘s mother resulted 
in not providing the girl the assistance she needed. According to the Inspectorate, a 
change of attitude is required: the child‘s interest should be the guiding principle, 
‗other perspectives‘ being subordinated to it (IJZ, 2005b, p. 44). In the Gessica case, 
similar comments are made, saying that practitioners have not focused enough on the 
child and its safety (e.g. IGZ, 2007). 
 
Monitoring and control in child protection services 
Whilst the reports mainly focus on front line practice, management-related issues are 
not ignored. They are most clearly addressed in the Savanna case, in which the Youth 
Care Inspectorate points to insufficient support and supervision of front line staff 
representing the Youth Care Agency and refers to a lacking system of monitoring and 
control. More specifically, the failures identified relate to making professional 
assessments and controlling information and assistance plans within the agency. Such 
a situation is believed to lead to ‗unacceptable risks‘ for children and young people 
whom child protection services should protect (IJZ, 2005b, p. 3). Also, the Child 
Protection Board is criticised in this case for not having carried out its legal duty to 
examine cases of supervision and out-of-home placements that will not be extended 
(IJZ, 2005b). 
 
Resources and staffing capacity 
Slightly different from the previous themes is the problem of availability of care. 
Some reports point to waiting lists at the Advice and Reporting Centre for Child 
Abuse and Neglect, resulting in a prioritisation of cases based on perceived urgency. 
The Youth Care Inspectorate sees a risk in long waiting times and in assigning cases 
to a waiting pile when urgency has not yet been assessed (e.g. IJZ, 2005c, 2006a, 
2007b). Also, other agencies are criticised for long waiting times before starting 
assistance (e.g. IJHVJB, 2000b; IJZ, 2007c). In the Gessica case, for instance, waiting 
times are believed to have contributed to the development of behavioural problems of 
the girl (IJZ, 2007c). 
 
A comparison with key issues in British investigations 
The main failures and concerns touched on in the Dutch inquiry reports show many 
similarities with recurring problems in British reviews and inquiries into child abuse 
tragedies. Problems of inter-agency co-operation, errors in communication and 
inadequate sharing of information are, for instance, among the main problems referred 
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to in British investigations (see, e.g. Hill, 1990; Munro, 1999; Sinclair and Bullock, 
2002; DfES et al., 2003; Reder and Duncan, 2004b; Lachman and Bernard, 2006; 
Brandon et al., 2008; Ofsted, 2008). This is well exemplified in the Victoria Climbié 
case, where the inquiry report points to the ‗dreadful state of communications which 
exposed Victoria to danger‘ (Lord Laming, 2003, p. 9). Also, the Baby Peter case may 
serve as an illustration. Quite similar to the Health Care Inspectorate‘s criticism on 
practitioners in the Savanna case, the second SCR into Baby Peter‘s death relates that 
his GP did have concerns but did not alert others, because ‗he assumed that others 
would have similar concerns and would be in a better position to take action‘ 
(Haringey Local Safeguarding Children Board (LSCB), 2009, p. 21). 
Just like Dutch reports, British inquiries and reviews perceive poor record-keeping 
and quality of child protection plans as problematic, as well as practitioners who did 
not follow basic procedures (see, e.g. Munro, 1998; Sinclair and Bullock, 2002; Reder 
and Duncan, 2004b; Ofsted, 2008; Rose and Barnes, 2008). The same applies to the 
complexity of interpreting signs of abuse, failures to recognise the significance of risk 
factors, overlooking information concerning the family history and not seeing the 
overall picture (see, e.g. Hill, 1990; Munro, 1996, 1998, 1999; Sinclair and Bullock, 
2002; Reder and Duncan, 2004b; Brandon et al., 2008; Ofsted, 2008; Rose and 
Barnes, 2008).  
In addition, failures to focus on the children and give enough weight to their needs 
and rights are viewed as a significant and recurring problem in British cases. Munro 
(2004c, pp. 77–8) refers to the inquiry report on the death of Jasmine Beckford in 
1985 that expressed the importance of children being social workers‘ primary 
concern. Interestingly, she notices that this meant ‗a significant shift from the view 
expressed in the first inquiry (Graham Bagnall 1973) which saw abusers and children 
equally in need of assessment and help‘. In its evaluation study, Ofsted (2008, p. 18) 
refers to the focus on the child as ‗possibly the single most significant practice failing 
throughout the majority of the serious case reviews‘. This issue is also highlighted in 
the Baby Peter case (Haringey LSCB, 2009).   
Problems and concerns regarding dealing with parents seem not unique either. 
British reports point to practitioners who appeared to have been guided too much by 
parents‘ views, and — as a consequence — might have accepted lower standards of 
care (e.g. Brandon et al., 2008; Ofsted, 2008). In the Baby Peter case, for instance, 
practitioners are believed to have been misled by the boy‘s mother. Supported by their 
own observations, they followed the mother‘s explanation for her son‘s injuries 
(Haringey LSCB, 2008). The second review of this case also goes into the complexity 
of working with parents and concludes that interventions have been ‗insufficiently 
challenging to the parent‘ (Haringey LSCB, 2009, p. 24). Similar to the Savanna case, 
the review touches the dilemma of striving after protecting a child from harm on the 
one hand and improving parenting and attachment between the child and his family on 
the other.  
Although the problems highlighted in Dutch inquiry reports and those addressed in 
British inquiries and reviews are highly similar, some differences appear as well. A 
main theme emerging from the Dutch reports that seems less reflected in British 
investigations is the insufficient availability of child welfare services, reflected in long 
waiting times and delays in providing assistance for children and families. Although 
problems concerning resources and staffing capacity are recognised in Britain as well 
(see, e.g. Ofsted, 2008), Dutch reports appear to put more emphasis on this ‗system‘s 
problem‘. Another difference relates to the attention paid to the role of universal 
services, with British reports putting more emphasis on the responsibilities of these 
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services in safeguarding children compared to Dutch reports. A partial explanation for 
this difference could be that most of the Dutch cases have exclusively been 
investigated by the Youth Care Inspectorate, focusing on specialised child welfare and 
protection services and not so much on the role of universal services. 
 
Recommendations of the inquiry reports 
Investigating the failures and problems in Dutch child welfare and protection work 
after fatal child abuse cases aims at improving practice and ultimately reducing the 
chance of similar cases recurring (see, e.g. IJZ, 2007b, 2007c; IGZ et al., 2007). As 
the Youth Care Inspectorate puts it, inquiries are meant to promote ‗the way of 
thinking and acting that is needed to systematically improve [provided] care‘ (IJZ, 
2007a, p. 48). It is assumed that the inquiry reports may contribute to the desired 
improvements (cf. IJHVJB, 2002a), for instance, by exercising a warning function to 
practitioners and agencies. In the Savanna case, this is expressed by the Health Care 
Inspectorate‘s conclusion that ‗insufficient has been learned from previous situations‘, 
since similar errors are made ‗in spite of the attention paid to the reports [into 
previous cases]‘ (IGZ, 2005, p. 6).   
The question of how to remedy the identified errors and problems is addressed in 
the reports‘ recommendations, which are directed to front line practice and agencies 
as well as to central and provincial governments. Recommendations on practice and 
institutional level order agencies and professionals to change attitudes and practices, 
to clarify and improve procedures and to adopt assessment frameworks and tools. 
Governments are mostly urged to increase the monitoring and control of child welfare 
services and agencies, improve organisational preconditions for child welfare 
agencies and develop guidelines and instructions for improving the quality of 
services. Neither the recommendations directed to professionals and agencies nor 
those targeted at the governmental level pay explicit attention to extra training of 
professionals to deal with problematic situations, or to the allocation of sufficient 
resources in order to reduce waiting lists.  
An important set of attitudes and practices that, according to the inquiry reports, 
should change has to do with the perceived failures to act properly on signs of abuse 
and to focus on the child. In this respect, the recommendations state that the safety of 
the child must be the guiding principle for child welfare services and they stress the 
potential hazards of keeping parents and children together as long as possible. This 
means a significant shift from the meaning formerly attached to ‗the child‘s best 
interests‘, which were thought to be served by maintaining the bond between parents 
and children as long as possible (Baartman, 2008). Not surprisingly, the solutions 
presented in the reports take the form of earlier intervention (IJZ, 2005b), 
‗recognising the boundaries of voluntary care‘ and ‗initiating the care needed in time 
by providing quasi-coercive assistance‘ (IGZ et al., 2007, p. 6). According to the 
Youth Care Inspectorate, it is about providing care ‗as heavy as needed, not as light as 
possible‘ (IJZ, 2005b, p. 45). With that, the Inspectorate reformulates an important 
former principle in Dutch childcare policy, stating that child welfare services should 
‗last as short as possible, be offered as close to the child as possible, and be as light as 
possible‘.  
What is especially striking about the recommendations is their emphasis on 
bureaucratic measures: designing or changing regulations, improving compliance with 
procedures, developing and improving guidelines and protocols, and using assessment 
frameworks and tools. Illustrative is the increasing importance attached to risk 
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assessment. Though not wholly absent from the previous reports, the need to make 
risk assessments is for the first time clearly stressed in the Youth Care Inspectorate‘s 
Savanna report (IJZ, 2005b). From then onwards, the reports tend to pay more explicit 
attention to this theme, reflected, for instance, in the distinct sections that several of 
them devote to the assessment of risks (e.g. IJZ, 2007b, 2007c, 2008b). This trend is 
also discernible in the annual reports of the Youth Care Inspectorate. Until 2003, 
‗risk‘, let alone its assessment, is entirely missing from them (cf. e.g. IJHVJB, 2001, 
2002b, 2003; IJZ, 2004). Particularly from 2005 on, risk assessment becomes 
unmistakably an important theme in the annual reports (cf. IJZ, 2005a, 2006b, 2007a, 
2008a, 2009). Characteristic in this respect as well is that the Inspectorate has 
demanded all Youth Care Agencies by 2009 to prioritise implementing ‗systematic 
and professional risk management‘ to children under supervision, using a 
‗standardised instrument‘, which will be monitored as of 2010 (IJZ, 2008c, p. 1).  
Here, again, there are important similarities with British inquiries and reviews. 
Like Dutch investigations, British ones tend to target their recommendations at a 
bureaucratic level. They mainly focus on the modification or creation of policies, 
compliance with procedures, refining technical aids such as assessment forms, and 
increasing monitoring (Reder and Duncan, 2004a). Thus, they contribute to a growing 
formalisation of practice, diminishing the scope for professional discretion (Munro, 
2005a, 2005b).  
 
Attributing blame 
Whilst Dutch and British investigations show many similarities in the problems they 
reveal and the solutions they offer, they differ considerably with respect to the 
allocation of responsibility. British inquiry reports tend to name and blame 
professionals where considered justified, attributing some responsibility to them for 
the death of the child concerned (Munro, 2004c; Burgess, 2008). This tendency may 
be related to the quasi-judicial way in which many inquiries are conducted and their 
formal aim of establishing responsibility where possible (cf. Corby et al., 1998), but it 
cannot be divorced from the wider societal context either. Child abuse deaths cause 
public outrage and a desire to hold someone responsible, whose satisfaction seems to 
require the blaming not only of the actual abusers, but also of professionals 
considered negligent (Munro, 2005b). A key role in voicing and amplifying public 
indignation and allocating blame is played by the media, which, in the UK, have a 
fairly negative coverage of child protection work (Aldridge, 1999; Franklin, 1999; 
Franklin and Parton, 2001; Hall et al., 2006) and do not hesitate to single out 
individual professionals (Aldridge, 1994, 1999). This was firmly illustrated in the 
Baby Peter case, in which The Sun successfully campaigned to sack various 
practitioners and senior managers. It may be argued that an important function of 
inquiries, which have often been established only after public and media pressure 
(Corby et al., 2001; Stanley and Manthorpe, 2004), is to provide authoritative 
confirmation of the negative public opinion by identifying culprits (cf. Sulitzeanu-
Keenan, 2006), thus contributing to the dynamics of blame (cf. Corby et al., 1998; 
Stanley and Manthorpe, 2004).  
However, in comparison with British inquiry reports, Dutch reports are remarkably 
reluctant in attributing responsibility to individuals. In a way, they even avoid the 
question of responsibility by abstaining from making a connection between identified 
problems and the fatal outcome, or denying such a connection. None of the inquiry 
reports concludes that the death of the children concerned was avoidable by better 
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practices, which is striking given that they nevertheless do assume that eliminating the 
identified risks and problems may reduce the chance of similar cases recurring. This 
paradox is most clearly shown in the Gessica case, in which the Inspectorate of 
Education asserts ‗Identifying risks is … important to support future policy that 
focuses on reducing the chance of similar events occurring in the future‘ (IO, 2007, p. 
1). 
At the same time, it is stated that ‗Identifying risks does not mean that the horrific 
event concerning Gessica could have been prevented with other procedures or other 
practices‘ (IO, 2007, p. 2; IJZ, 2007b, p. 6, 2007c, p. 6). 
Another quote from one of the Gessica reports, emphasising that ‗presence of risks 
is not equal to identifying culprits‘ (IO, 2007, p. 1), makes it plausible that the 
inspectorates‘ restraint in establishing causal responsibility for child abuse deaths 
relates to a conscious attempt to avoid scapegoating individuals. 
The foregoing certainly does not mean that the inquiry reports avoid criticising 
professional failure. However, their criticism is mostly directed to agencies instead of 
specific professionals. Even in the reports that clearly criticise individual 
professionals, viz. the ones concerning the cases of Savanna and Gessica, most 
attention is devoted to organisational and systemic shortcomings and risks. Moreover, 
as individual professionals are kept anonymous, the reports provide them with a 
certain degree of protection from blaming practices. 
Considering this, it is ironic that the Youth Care Inspectorate‘s inquiry into the 
Savanna case seems to have contributed to the prosecution of Savanna‘s family 
supervisor. On the same day as the Youth Care Inspectorate published its report, 10 
March 2005, the public prosecutor announced a preliminary investigation into the 
supervisor‘s practice, in which, among several others, one Youth Care Inspector and 
two Health Care Inspectors would be heard. In December 2006, it was decided to 
charge the supervisor with culpable homicide or grievous bodily harm by culpable 
negligence. Thus, the prosecution assumed a relationship between failing practice and 
the fatal event, taking the step that the inquiry reports hesitated to take. However, 
during the court proceedings, only the charge of grievous bodily harm by culpable 
negligence was maintained, and a suspended community sentence was demanded. The 
court eventually acquitted the family supervisor on 16 November 2007, judging the 
fatal maltreatment of Savanna neither predictable nor preventable, and a causal 
relationship with the supervisor‘s errors unproved. The prosecution did not appeal the 
acquittal. 
With the indictment of the family supervisor, the trend to responsibilize 
professionals for preventing child abuse tragedies reached its preliminary climax. Yet, 
although this attempt to attribute blame in its ultimate form can be seen in a way as a 
logical sequel to the Youth Care Inspectorate‘s relatively severe judgement, at the 
same time, it seems to be a somewhat isolated event. Prosecution was apparently 
neither intended nor wanted by the Youth Care Inspectorate. In newspaper interviews, 
the head of the Inspectorate said she was surprised about the prosecutor‘s decision to 
single out the supervisor, who was not the sole responsible. She stated moreover that 
the penal approach would have been unnecessary, and causes child-care workers to 
feel threatened and under pressure (Trouw, 14 June 2006, 16 December 2006). Also, 
the explicitness of the above-quoted statements on preventability and culpability in 
the Gessica reports, appearing during the prosecution of Savanna‘s supervisor, seems 
to indicate a wish on behalf of the inspectorates to avoid likewise procedures. 
What is perhaps more striking, though, is the scarce public and media support for 
the trial against Savanna‘s family supervisor. Child protection work in the Savanna 
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case was certainly covered in a critical way, particularly after the Youth Care 
Inspectorate‘s report was published, but the criticism was mainly directed to certain 
agencies as well as the child protection system in general. Individual professionals 
were hardly focused on by the press, and the decision to charge Savanna‘s supervisor 
was taken without any public or media demand to do so. Quite contrarily, the media 
devoted a lot of attention to people voicing concerns over and opposition to the 
prosecution, giving a stage mainly to child-care professionals and the family 
supervisor‘s counsels. The few newspapers that defended the decision to charge the 
supervisor did so in a rather nuanced manner. 
The media‘s reporting of the Savanna case fits in the general pattern that the 
coverage of child protection work has followed since the Roermond case. From then 
onwards, the media have been reporting on child protection services in an increasingly 
negative way, although mostly indirectly, by quoting people and bodies offering 
criticism. Negative reporting, however, rarely concerns individuals. Criticism is 
mostly directed at specific agencies or ‗the system‘ and certain features thereof, such 
as waiting lists and bureaucracy. This makes the Dutch media climate considerably 
less hostile towards individual child welfare and protection workers than that in the 
UK, which could explain at least part of the difference between Dutch and British 
child death inquiries in their degree of allocating responsibility to individual 
professionals. Yet, it should be kept in mind that a societal climate in which child 
protection work faces broad criticism, albeit mainly targeted at agencies and the 
system in general instead of individuals, nevertheless increases the pressure felt by the 
professionals working in the system. 
 
Discussion 
As we have shown in this paper, Dutch inquiries bear significant resemblance to 
British investigations regarding both the problems and risks they identify and the 
solutions they propose. In the Netherlands, as well as in Britain, problems in 
professional practice relate, for instance, to the difficulty of assessing child abuse 
signs and dealing with parents, as well as a lack of inter-professional collaboration 
and information exchange. Both Dutch and British investigation reports try to address 
these problems mainly by bureaucratic measures, focusing on procedures, protocols 
and assessment instruments, and on increasing monitoring of professional practice. 
However, in Britain, this kind of solution has, to date, been unable to solve the 
identified problems. Despite numerous inquiries and reviews into child abuse fatalities 
in the last three decades and the subsequent introduction of more detailed assessment 
frameworks, new procedures and increased monitoring, professional practice seems to 
be hardly improved and the same problems still persist (Reder and Duncan, 2004a; 
Munro, 2005b). 
Partly, this may have to do with the ‗culture of blame‘ in British society, which 
seems to have worsened child protection work by encouraging practitioners and 
agencies to develop defensive practices that let their own protection dominate over the 
protection of children (cf. Stanley and Manthorpe, 2004; Munro, 2004c, 2005b; 
Lachman and Bernard, 2006). At this point, there are significant differences between 
the UK and the Netherlands and between investigations in both countries, though, as 
we have seen, the chance of being criticised or blamed for failing to prevent a child 
abuse death has increased also in the Netherlands.  
Yet, the lack of improvement cannot wholly be attributed to fear of blame among 
practitioners and agencies, but seems also related to the inadequacy of the 
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bureaucratic solutions to which the investigation reports tend to resort. As British 
research suggests, these solutions do not fit the identified problems, or at least not all 
of them. Reder and Duncan (2004a, p. 102) point to the fact that despite the 
preoccupation with procedures, there is ‗little evidence that the problems lay with the 
procedures themselves‘. According to Munro (2005a, 2005b), the inclination to 
change procedures, issue more detailed protocols and introduce stricter monitoring 
usually ignores the actual problem of why practitioners omitted crucial steps in the 
procedure or overlooked signs of abuse.  
Given the similarities with British investigations, it is not surprising that the 
discrepancy between the nature of the problems and the focus of the solutions appears 
also in the Dutch inquiry reports. Although some of the problems revealed in the 
reports are mainly at the organisational level and may be tackled by changing policies 
and procedures, many involve difficulties and errors that relate to human judgement 
and action. This ‗human factor‘ can by no means be fully addressed by bureaucratic 
measures. To avoid the problem of manipulation by parents, for instance, one should 
first and foremost be sufficiently trained and have enough psychological 
understanding to recognise manipulation. And, to properly assess signs of abuse, 
protocols and assessment instruments may be helpful, but, in the end, it is humans 
who have to judge and decide. These basic insights are largely ignored due to the 
inquiry reports‘ bureaucratic focus. It is true in a way that the human factor does 
receive attention in the reports, as there are some non-bureaucratic recommendations 
that aim at changing certain attitudes and practices of professionals and agencies. 
However, the recommendations try to bring about this change merely by issuing 
imperatives (and increased monitoring), and so cannot be taken very seriously. 
Failures that are made repeatedly seem to be related to some basic ways of human 
reasoning (cf. Munro, 1999) or to persistent difficulties in practice, and therefore 
cannot be expected to disappear if they are simply forbidden. 
The one-sided focus of the inquiry reports on bureaucratic solutions is not only 
inadequate, but may even lead to adverse effects. In a context of considerable public 
pressure, heavy workloads and many inexperienced practitioners, as is the case in the 
Netherlands, the strong emphasis on following procedures and using assessment tools 
threatens to create its own rationality, displacing the actual interests at stake in child 
protection work. The more practice becomes formalised and monitored, the more time 
practitioners need to spend on administrative paperwork. This leaves little time for 
contact with clients (cf. Bruning, 2007), which can be considered crucial in making a 
proper assessment of needs and risks. Furthermore, there is a real risk that growing 
pressure to follow the correct procedures leads to defensive rule-following, narrowing 
down the scope of child protection work to meeting bureaucratic requirements, which 
may easily become an end in itself. The problem is that mere rule-following or tool-
applying is not the same as good practice and may even be contrary to it, endangering 
the actual protection of children (cf. Parton, 1998; Munro, 2004b). This applies even 
more when procedures or tools are poorly suited for use in practice, as exemplified by 
Broadhurst et al.‘s (2009) findings on the counter productive effects of the initial 
assessment system in England and Wales. 
However, there is a more fundamental problem with the reliance on formalising 
child protection work. In a climate in which child protection services are increasingly 
held responsible for preventing fatal child abuse, the unrealistic expectation seems to 
be fostered that child abuse deaths may be avoided if only the procedures are followed 
or decision-making tools are applied. Especially, risk assessment tools seem 
surrounded by a sense of predictability and certainty. To be sure, such tools may 
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support a systematic assessment of risks, but they surely cannot predict or detect child 
abuse with certainty (Munro, 1999, 2004a). Not only is the accuracy of risk 
assessment instruments often grossly over-estimated and difficult to determine 
(Munro, 1999, 2004a; Littlechild, 2008), but they are moreover not able to provide 
certainty even if there are concrete signs that may indicate child abuse. Probable signs 
of child abuse are difficult to interpret and may or may not point to actual abuse 
(Hoefnagels, 2001). This uncertainty can never be completely resolved, as it is 
inherently related to the contingent and complex nature of the social world 
(Littlechild, 2008; Stevens and Cox, 2008). Overlooking these limitations may lead to 
a tunnel vision and eventually to wrong decisions, based on either false positives or 
false negatives (cf. Munro, 2004a). 
Considering the foregoing, we think the current focus of the Dutch inquiries makes 
them not very likely to really contribute to improving child protection practice and 
preventing child abuse deaths. Making progress should start with the recognition that 
bureaucratic solutions cannot provide a panacea for all problems. Bureaucratic 
solutions can only work if they are sufficiently attuned to the skills of professionals 
(cf. Munro, 2005a, 2005b) and if they are applied by professionals that have the skills 
to do so (cf. Munro, 2004a). Moreover, they may only partially solve the revealed 
problems, as these relate in large part to human judgement and action, and cannot be 
fully remedied by procedures and assessment instruments. Therefore, more attention 
should be given to the human side of child welfare and protection work, and that in a 
non-blaming manner. 
This should also imply that the inquiries do not limit themselves to ascertaining 
which problems and errors have occurred, but investigate more in depth why and how 
they have occurred, in order to find the most apt solutions (cf. Munro, 2005a, 2005b). 
These solutions may include, besides procedural change and the use of decision-
making tools, extra training for professionals on specific topics. Last, but certainly not 
least, sufficient resources are a necessary precondition for improvement in child 
welfare and protection, and therefore deserve also explicit attention in the 
recommendations of inquiry reports. 
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